Using a unique employee-establishment matched survey, we find a causal relationship between an individual employee's trust of management and the delegation of real authority. We utilize both fixed effects and instrumental variables to control for unobserved factors: establishmentlevel fixed effects control for management quality, practices, culture and other characteristics; our instruments of inherited trust in management and employee disability address the possible endogeneity of employee trust. Across all specifications, we find that delegation of real authority is more likely if an employee trusts management. Our results are consistent with the theoretical literature on delegation; in particular, when contracts are incomplete trust between a principal and an agent can sustain delegation when it would not otherwise be possible.
Introduction
Firms exist in large part to replace market transactions with (bureaucratic) authority relations with employees (Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986) . The resulting scale, specialization and division of labour inside modern firms, however, invariably means that valuable information is distributed across many agents at different levels in an organization's hierarchy. Furthermore, often these agents are unable -or unwilling -to fully share this information in a cogent and timely way (Radner, 1993; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 1998; Prendergast, 2002; Dessein, 2002; Meagher et al., 2004) . Delegation of decision-making rights is one way to make use of agents' information and know-how. As a result, managers do not just supervise employees -a key task of a manager is to exercise oversight of the delegation of real authority in the face of non-contractible actions and information. 1 corporations (La Porta et al., 1997) and more delegation across plants (Bloom et al., 2012) .
Micro-founded work on trust and firms is quite rare due to the difficulty of obtaining data. In a recent study, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) find that an ongoing relationship between firms is important for understanding why supply shocks in the Kenyan rose market are not always exploited.
Within firms, Guiso et al. (2015) and Brown et al. (2015) find a positive relationship between a firm's financial performance and the average trustworthiness of its managers as assessed by employees, but they are unable to identify a mechanism for how trust impacts performance.
Similarly, to date, the empirical literature on decision making has largely sidestepped analyzing the impact of trust, due mainly to the absence of individual-level data on authority in general and trust in particular. The focus has instead been on the business environment. Empirically, Colombo and Delmastro (2004) find that decisions relating to labor (as compared with capital decisions) are more likely to be delegated. Acemoglu et al. (2007) find that decentralization is more likely the closer a firm is to the technology frontier. Bloom et al. (2012) investigate delegation from head office to a plant using regional measures of trust in general society and societal trust of foreigners. McElheran (2014) examines the trade-off between delegation (allowing for adaption) and centralization (aiding coordination) of IT purchases within US manufacturing firms. Bloom et al. (2010) find a positive relationship between competition and delegation. Similarly, Meagher and Wait (2014) emphasize the relationship between delegation and external factors, such as product-market uncertainty, competition and participation in export markets.
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Our focus on trust at the level of the individual employee has several advantages. First, theoretical models typically focus on individual principal-agent relationships, not aggregate relationships between a principal and a work group, or between divisions or plants in an organization. This means that our empirical study is closely related to the existing theoretical literature, and in fact we confirm its main prediction; specifically, we find a positive relationship between delegation of real authority to an employee and the employee's trust of management. Second, by focusing on individuals, we are able to extend beyond firm-level analysis to examine how outcomes differ with individual characteristics like tenure, education and gender. Indeed, our results show that a significant proportion of the observed variation is not explained by establishment (fixed) effects and that there is sizable and statistically significant within-establishment effect from individual employee trust.
The instrumental-variable approach we use is based on two exogenous factors; (i) average trust in management by the employee's country of origin; and (ii) employee disability. The first instrument relates to the transmission of social norms 8 for trust through inheritance. The transmission and persistence of social norms is itself currently an active area of economic research. Experiments on the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) have repeatedly shown participants in the lab follow strategies in one-shot interactions that cannot have positive payoffs if their opponents maximize monetary payoffs (Camerer, 2003) . Furthermore, the presence of trust measured in these games varies significantly across countries (Camerer, 2003, p87) and on the nationalities of the participants (Glaeser et al., 2000) .
Theoretical models, such as Bisin and Verdier (2001) , posit the transmission of social norms or culture both from parents and through contemporaneous external factors such as institutions 7 A closely related literature looks at hierarchical structure and reporting (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010; Guadalupe et al., 2014; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2014) . 8 We use the term "social norms" broadly to cover the closely related ideas of culture and social capital also discussed in the literature. and socialization. This gives rise to the persistence of group social norms across time, as observed empirically by Uslaner (2008) , Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and in the papers surveyed in Bisin and Verdier (2010) . One consequence of this persistence is that immigrants will have trust determined partly by local experiences and partly by inherited trust from their home country. Algan and Cahuc (2010) use this fact to generate an exogenous measure of general trust in society; we follow a similar method to generate our instrument. To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first examination of incorporating inherited characteristics in a study of employee trust of their workplace managers. In doing so, we identify a mechanism by which trust affects individual-level economic activities.
Our second instrument relates to whether an employee has a medium-or long-term disability condition that cannot be overcome readily (by wearing glasses for example). Employees with a disability will have less trust in institutions and of those in authority due to a history of repeated negative interactions, which typically start in childhood and arise in a range of social circumstances.
Children with a disability are 3.68 times more likely to be the victim of violence than other children (Jones et al., 2012) . Furthermore, disabled adults with non-specific impairments were 1.3 times more likely to be the victims of violence than non-disabled adults (3.86 times more likely for people with mental illness) (Hughes et al., 2017) . The disabled are also widely viewed with suspicion: a study in the UK found that people thought that 40 per cent of disability pension claimants were fraudulent, whereas the true number was estimated to be less than 2 per cent by the relevant government agency (Shakespeare, 2012) . The non-disabled are often uncomfortable interacting with people who have a disability (Richardson et al., 1961) . Further to that, studies of students show that the non-disabled often cut short or avoid interactions with a person who they believe has a disability (Fichten, 1988; Snyder et al., 1979; Kleck et al., 1966) and prefer more personal space when interacting with a stranger with a disability than otherwise (Kleck et al., 1966; Kleck, 1969) .
9 It is our contention that such negative attitudes and repeated negative interactions marginalize the disabled and generally erodes their trust.
As a consequence, employees who have a disabling condition bring with them their lower trust in management (and others generally) to their current place of employment, which in turn affects management's ability to delegate to them. This variable taps into the history of stigmatization and victimization of those with disabilities, and the ill-feeling that this can give rise to. Moreover, such a disability or condition, in of itself, is not directly related to management's choice of delegation.
Some of the key results in the paper are as follows. First, from the data is it evident that there is considerable variation between employees in the real authority they enjoy, both within an establishment and across the economy. Second, trust in management also varies substantially between individuals, even at the same plant. Taken together, this suggests that both real decisionmaking authority and trust relate to the individual, rather than to the establishment or the firm, validating our approach. Third, as noted above, we find that employee trust in management is positively and significantly associated with delegation of real decision-making authority. Moreover, the magnitude of this relationship is economically important. Finally, this result continues to hold when we account for: (i) establishment-level fixed effects; and (ii) potential endogeneity using an instrumental-variable approach.
9 See Comer and Piliavin (1972) for a similar study. 
Data Set and Variables

Centralization of decision-making: dependent variables
Employees were asked '[i]n general, how much influence or input do you have about the following?
The type of work you do; How you do your work; When you start and finish work; The pace at which you do your job; The way the workplace is managed or organised; Decisions which affect you at this workplace. For each of the six questions, employees can respond: (1) a lot; (2) some; (3) a little; or (4) none.
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Each of these questions captures related, but different, aspects of the decentralization of decision authority. Figure 1 shows the influence employees have over these various aspects of their work. In general, employees have more influence over how they do their job and the pace of work than the way the plant is organized or about plant decisions that affect them.
To make use of this information, we generate a variable Centralization, by summing the scores across all six questions and creating a Z-score with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1; lower values of this variable indicate greater decentralization or employee influence. Bloom et al. (2012) utilize an equivalent index of decentralization. Further to this, our measure of decentralization aids a comparison with the literature as it is based on similar questions as the ones used by Colombo and Delmastro (2004) , Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Bloom et al. (2012) .
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As an alternative measure of our dependent variable, we undertake factor analysis of the six aspects of decision-making autonomy; the first factor has an Eigen value of 2.986, whereas the other factors have Eigen values of 0.303 or less. We retain the first factor, denoted as Centraliza-10 AWIRS was a government run survey so establishments were randomly selected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Business Register. 2547 establishments were identified to give the 2001 responses. The survey and the data are described in detail in Morehead et al. (1997) 11 There was also another possible answer of 'Don't know', but only 0.1 percent of employees gave this response. 12 While there is some subjectivity in these questions, previous studies have also relied on surveys with subjective questions. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2007) use subjective answers on establishment's autonomy regarding investment, and on manager's autonomy/authority regarding employment decisions. Similarly, the measure of delegation in Colombo and Delmastro (2004) is based on subjective answers from the plant manager. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables of interest, including the dependent variables Centralization and Centralization(Factor). Table 2 outlines the pairwise correlations between the key variables.
Explanatory variables
Employee characteristics. Employees were asked whether '[m] anagement at this workplace can be trusted to tell things the way they are'. Using this information, we generate a measure of Trust equal to 1 if the employee agrees with the statement and 0 otherwise.
We create a dummy variable if an employee is Male (1) or otherwise (0). Variables were created indicating each employee's Tenure and their tenure squared (Tenure sq) at the plant. Similarly, a series of dummies are generated for the employee's age and their highest level of education. Dummy variables for the employee's occupational group were also constructed. These three sets of dummy variables are included in most of the estimates below.
Empirical results
The key relationship we examine is between employee trust of management and the allocation of decision-making authority. Figure 2 highlights some of the important features of Trust and of our The second panel, in the top right-hand corner, plots the distribution of average plant-level Trust.
Since Trust is a binary variable, the average of Trust within a plant is the proportion of employees who trust management. From this, it is evident that within most plants there is considerable diversity in employee trust of management, suggesting trust is an individual, not a plant, characteristic. This highlights a significant advantage of our approach: we explore trust and its relationship to delegation at the employee level.
The lower left-hand panel of Figure 2 shows the kernel-density plots of the within-plant variation (the dotted line) and the between-plant variation (the black line) of Centralization. 13 While both densities are centred around 0, the within-plant distribution has a greater variance than the between-13 Within-plant means after subtracting the plant mean. Between-plant means comparing plant means. 
Trust and delegation within plants: Fixed-effects estimation
To explore the relationship between an employee's trust of management and delegation, we estimate both pooled OLS and establishment/plant fixed-effects (FE) models. The OLS estimating equation
where c i is the centralization index, t i is Trust and X i is a vector of individual characteristics and controls as described previously. The fixed-effects specification adds a constant u j[i] for each establishment j, where the function j[i] identifies the establishment j of which person i is an employee: Table 4 ). While not implying causality, these results provide insight into the relationship between trust and delegation. 
) 2 +(σε i ) 2 where σε i is the standard deviation of residuals of the overall error term ε i . For Models (3) and (4) the overall R 2 is reported, which excludes the effect of the fixed effects.
Model (1) shows the estimated OLS coefficients for our key explanatory variables, using Centralization as a dependent variable, without any other controls. Model (2) shows the pooled OLS estimation results (no establishment-level fixed effects) with education, employee age and occupa- The estimated coefficient for Male is negative and significant -males are more likely to be delegated decision-making rights, other things equal. In addition, the estimated coefficient for Tenure is also negative and significant. Tenure is typically interpreted as a proxy for the accumulation of an employee's firm-specific human capital; tenure allows an employee to accumulate the requisite specific information to make effective decisions.
Individual plant managers no doubt have their own style; it is possible, for example, that some managers will have a greater propensity to delegate than others. Plant managers will also differ in their abilities and in the other work practices they adopt. These plant-level factors have been the focus of a significant literature including Barron and Hannan (2002) , Ichniowski et al. (1997), Bloom and ; Bandiera et al. (2007) and Ichniowski and Shaw (2013) . Consequently, it is important to account for omitted establishment characteristics. To do this we estimate plant-level fixed-effect models, as shown in Models (3) and (4). Overall these results show that both establishment and individual employee characteristics are important for understanding delegation. Thus it is imperative to extend the existing establishmentlevel models to include information on employees and their relationship with management.
The estimates from Model (3) show a strong and significant positive relationship between delegation and employee Trust of management. This is an important empirical finding; controlling for plant-level fixed-effects, there is a significant relationship between Trust and the allocation of decision authority within an establishment. The estimated impact of trust is large: three-times the size of having a postgraduate degree (compared with not finishing high school) and just a little smaller than the impact of being a professional vis-a-vis a laborer (Table 4 , discussed further below). Furthermore, using plant-level fixed effects has very little impact on the estimated coefficients for
Trust and Tenure, although the coefficient on Male decreases in both magnitude and significance.
These results suggest that while managerial ability and plant practices are important, the relationship between employee trust and delegation remains -if an employee trusts management, there is a higher probability of delegation to that individual.
As a robustness check, Model (4), also in Table 3 , uses the alternative dependent variable of the first factor (Centralization(Factor)). These estimates again include the plant fixed effects. The results are very similar to the estimated coefficients in the first two models; crucially, the relationship between Trust and delegation remains significant. Table 4 reports the additional estimated coefficients for Models (2), (3) and (4), from Table 3 . The impact of the establishment/plant level fixed effects on the estimated coefficients for the education, occupation and age categories can be seen by comparing the results in Models (2) and (3), displayed
in Table 4 .
The probability of delegation increases strongly, on average, with highest educational attainment of the employee (Table 4 , Model 2), however this effect is substantially smaller within an establishment (Table 4 , Model 3). This suggests that the differences in delegation across educational levels in the labor market are in large part due to sorting: establishments with more highly educated employees are more decentralized on average.
Including establishment fixed effects also reduces the size of the estimated coefficients for the age dummy variables (Table 4 , Models 3 and 4). Moreover, controlling for tenure (shown in Table 3), the impact of age is non-linear, with the estimated coefficients displaying an inverted-U shape. This is true both across the economy (pooled OLS) and within an establishment (fixed effect). While intriguing, it is not possible to tell with our data if this reflects a property of career dynamics or something about the changing nature of work over time.
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As one might expect, occupations such as manager and professional have, ceteris paribus, the strongest link with delegation. Furthermore, the relationships between occupations and delegation are largely unaffected by plant fixed effects.
Overall, these results give very strong support to the idea that more of the benefits of decentralization can be realized when there is trust between an employee and management. Of course, while our estimates are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions, our results are not a full test of any particular theory; in particular, these empirical results do not describe the underlying conditions that help facilitate a 'trust'-based equilibrium. Furthermore, we are yet to account for the potential endogeneity between delegation and trust -we turn to this issue now.
Instrumental-variable approach
Our estimates in the previous section show a statistically significant and economically important relationship between employee trust and delegation. This relationship remains after controlling for establishment-level fixed effects that could include factors such as managerial quality, management practices or culture. However, there is still the potential for the endogeneity of employee's trust.
As is typical, three types of endogeneity are of potential concern: measurement error; omittedvariable bias; and simultaneity. Below we follow the standard approach (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) and use an instrumental-variables (IV) approach to address endogeneity. The possible omitted variable bias and the simultaneity of Trust and Centralization follow well documented patterns and can be resolved by finding appropriate instruments (Gujarati, 2005; Wooldridge, 2000) . The possible issues of measurement error, which are more closely related to the details of our data, merit further discussion.
Measurement error could impact our estimated results in several ways. First, there could be noise in the reporting of the questions making up Centralization, our decision-making allocation measure. This noise will be mitigated to some degree by averaging the six questions.
16 The impact of the residual noise in the dependent variable is to decrease the goodness of fit in our estimation, biasing us against finding statistically significant results. Second, any noise in the reporting of Trust would produce attenuation, biasing the coefficient on Trust towards zero. Thus in both of these cases the potential bias works against finding a significant relationship between (de)centralization and trust.
A measurement-error issue that could arise from our subjective variables is common-methods or survey bias. Survey bias could occur if there exists a common factor s i that distorts individual responses to the key subjective questions in the survey. This might be due to the survey itself (an individual is more positive in answering questions face-to-face) or due to idiosyncratic factors like feeling tired/sick or individuals may exhibit the psychology trait of making their responses unrealistically consistent. This last effect is often referred to as the 'halo effect' because positive assessments of one characteristic typically spill over into positive assessments of unrelated characteristics (Kahneman, 2011).
We develop the following model, based on classical errors-in-variables (CEV) framework, as in
Wooldridge (2000), but extended to a common factor for the error, in order to explore our survey bias issue. Specifically assume that both 'true' trust, t * i , and true 'centralization' c * i are mis-measured due to a common factor (mean zero) survey effect s i so that we actually observed t and c:
The standard CEV assumption gives corr(t * i , s i ) = 0 and corr(c * i , s i ) = 0, and the true relationship (omitting establishment fixed effects for convenience) is
where X is the vector of variables unaffected by measurement error. Except for the measurement error we assume that the standard regression assumptions are satisfied: in particular is uncorrelated with c * , t * , x and s. Substituting for the observed variables gives
Rearranging we get
where γ = α 2 − β 1 α 1 and e i = γs i + i . In our case α 1 and α 2 plausibly have the same sign, and thus the sign of the bias arising from the common factor survey bias depends on the empirical magnitudes of the coefficients. Thus, common factor survey bias is a particular form of omitted variable bias.
We use an IV approach to account for endogeneity, including omitted variable bias. We have two candidate instruments; (i) trust of management by country of birth and (ii) employee disability.
An employee's country of origin potentially affects their trust in management due to the social reproduction of norms as described by Bisin and Verdier (2001) . That is, the institutions, and culture of where someone was born could help shape their trust in others and their overall attitude to authority -see Bidner and Francois (2011) and Bloom et al. (2012) , for example. 17 We calculate the average level of trust for employees from each country of birth, excluding all observations from each employee's own establishment or plant.
18 The variable -Inherited Trust -is used as our first instrument for an employee's trust in management. A key advantage of this instrument is that potential endogeneity between employee trust and delegation within an establishment is ruled out because an employee's own establishment is excluded by definition. Thus, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe Inherited Trust is exogenous in the second-stage regression.
It is well documented that many minority groups, including the disabled, experience stigma throughout their lives, often beginning in school. It has been shown that disabled people are more likely to be the victims of violence (Jones et al., 2012; Hughes et al., 2017) and to be ostracized (Fichten, 1988; Snyder et al., 1979; Kleck et al., 1966) . Public opinion is also biased towards the disabled as a group, with the widespread erroneous belief that claims of disability are frequently fraudulent (Shakespeare, 2012) . We argue that these repeated negative interactions are associated with lower social capital and greater distrust of authority and institutions. People with disabilities experience differential treatment throughout life and this causes them to have an exogenously lower trust in authority, of which current management is just one example.
The conditions for Disability to be a valid instrument require that it is exogenous/excluded from the second stage of the IV regression. Given the strong case for the exogeneity of the other instrument, Inherited Trust, we use an overidentification test to investigate this condition. The
Hansen J overidentification test fails to reject that Disability is exogenous as it is not significantly related to the residuals in the second-stage equation (see Table 5 ).
Instrumental Validity and Identification
The key IV estimates are reported in Table 5 (first-stage) and Table 6 (second-stage). In all Models (5-10) the (endogenous) dependent variable in the first stage is Trust and the dependent variable in the second stage is Centralization. Models (8)- (10) report our IV results accounting for establishment/plant fixed effects. Statistical tests on the appropriateness of the IV approach and the related inference are given at the bottom of Table 5 and in Table 6 .
The instruments perform well; they are significant both separately (Models 5, 6, 8 and 9) and jointly (Models 7 and 10) in the first-stage regressions for both the IV and fixed-effects-IV specifications. The coefficient signs accord with the theories presented above: higher Inherited Trust is associated with higher individual trust; and people with a Disability are indeed less likely to trust management.
The validity of standard inference on the Trust coefficient in the second-stage IV regressions requires sufficiently 'strong' identification (not weak instruments). Rather than the standard F-test, the valid test of the significance of the instruments for our model with clustered standard errors is the Montiel-Pflueger Effective F-test, with its appropriately adjusted critical values -see Montiel and Pflueger (2013) , Nelson and Startz (1990) and Stock and Yogo (2005) for example.
The test statistic and the critical values for weak identification are given at the bottom of Table 5 .
The critical values are all given for a 5% level of significance but vary with the degrees of freedom and τ , the amount of bias; see Montiel and Pflueger (2013) and Pflueger and Wang (2015) . Our preferred specification, Model (10), includes the full set of age, education and occupation controls, both instruments and plant-level fixed effects. For the preferred model, (10), the hypothesis of weak identification/weak instruments is rejected at the 5% level of significance (with a τ of 5%); and hence standard inference on the coefficient for Trust should be valid.
Estimation Results
The first-stage results for the other controls in Table 5 are economically interesting in their own right. There are gender differences in trust (Models 5-7) but these disappear once we include Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level. a. Clustered standard errors in parentheses for 1773 plants estimated in Columns (4), (5), (6) and (7), respectively. The second stage IV estimates for Centralization are shown in Table 6 . The second-stage dependent variable is Centralization for all models. b. Cluster robust test for weak instruments. H 0 : Weak identification. c. Critical vales for α = 5% test of null with worst case relative bias of 2SLS compared to OLS of τ . + Significant at 5%, τ = 30%. ++ Significant at 5%, τ = 5% establishment fixed effects. Tenure has a convex relationship with trust and is negative for most employees.
19 Thus it appears that, on average, employees' trust of management is eroded rather than built over time. Exogenous instruments (evaluated at the null). *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level. First-stage estimates shown in Table 5 .
The second-stage IV estimates indicate a positive and highly significant relationship between
Trust and delegation. The estimated coefficient increases in absolute size (becomes more negative) compared with the estimated Trust coefficients in Table 3 . Moreover, the Trust coefficient is much larger than those for other employee characteristics, such as gender or tenure. As suggested by various perspectives, such as the the relational-contracting literature, high-trust relationships appear to be markedly different from low-trust management-employee relationships.
The change in the Trust coefficients between Table 3 and 6 indicates the importance of addressing endogeneity. Of course, we do not know the specific form of the endogeneity, however, as discussed above one potential candidate is behavioral: a 'halo' effect could produce common factor survey bias. Nevertheless, across all specifications, trust is significantly related to delegation.
Weak-identification-robust inference
The analysis above indicates that our instruments are valid and, therefore, standard inference shows trust causes a significant increase in delegation. As a robustness check, here we explore whether we can infer the same conclusion about the connection between trust and delegation using the methods of weak identification (weak instruments).
In Table 6 It is also possible to test the exogeneity of the instruments in the second stage using the methods of weak identification. The resulting J Test fails to reject the null of exogenous instruments. Notes: a. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level. Clustered standard errors are for 1773 plants. IV Model (10) estimated including full set of educational, age and occupational controls, establishment fixed effects; instruments for Trust are Inherited Trust and Disability.
Robustness of decision-authority measure
As shown above, across a range of specifications we find a robust and economically important relationship between trust and the delegation of decision-making authority to individual employees.
Here we present two more robustness checks: (i) using alternative construction methods for our Centralization variable; and (ii) re-examining the relationship between trust and decision-making authority considering separately establishments from the services sector.
As described above in Section 2, our main dependent variable is a composite of six separate aspects of an employee's decision-making authority: type of work; how to do the work; start and finish times; pace of work; influence regarding workplace organization; and influence on decisions in the firm that affect the employee. Here, we explore if the estimated relationship between trust and decision-making authority is driven by any one of these six measures. To do this we exclude each measure, one by one, so as to construct six new augmented Z-scores of decision making.
Each column in the top section of Table 7 indicates which of the five measures of authority are included (indicated by a 1) and the measure that has been excluded (indicated by a 0) in the augmented Z-score. Each of these six new authority variables are then used as the second-stage dependent variable in the fixed-effects IV Model (10), our preferred specification. This estimation includes establishment fixed effects, all age, education and occupation controls, and both Inherited
Trust and Disability as instruments. For the sake of brevity, only the key estimated coefficients on instrumented Trust are reported here.
These result suggest that the estimated relationship between trust and delegation holds for all six of these new variables. Moreover, there is very little change in the estimated coefficient on
instrumented Trust compared to Table 6 . Specifically, the estimated coefficient on Trust in the original specification (Model (10), Table 6 ) lies in between the smallest (-2.980) and the largest (-2.775) of these new estimates. 21 Overall, this suggests that our estimated relationship between
Trust and delegation is robust to alternative specifications of decision-making authority. Notes: a. *** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level. Model (12) is equivalent to fixed-effects IV Model (10) with a full set of education, age and occupational controls, excluding establishments in the mining and manufacturing industries. Clustered standard errors for 1372 plants shown in parentheses.
Finally, this cross-industry study includes establishments from mining, manufacturing and the services sector. While we have included fixed effects to control for establishment effects, no doubt technical requirements will differ across different industries; for example, technical reasons might dictate that someone working in manufacturing has less autonomy over the pace of work or the time they start than an employee in some roles in the services sector. To account for these possible issues, we re-estimate Model (10) for only the services-sector establishments (excluding any plant from the mining and manufacturing sectors), see Table 8 . These results are very similar to the estimates obtained using the full sample, reaffirming the statistically significant and economically important relationship between trust and decision-making allocation.
Concluding comments
If a manager is willing to delegate authority to a subordinate when contracts are incomplete, she must, in some sense, trust them to do the right thing. A employee will also, no doubt, have an opinion about the trustworthiness of management. This is relevant to the design of an organization because if an employee trusts their superiors, management can make promises with some credibility, even in the absence of legal enforcement. Theories like relational-contracting models formalize this idea; within a repeated-game framework, trust of management by employees enables delegation. If feasible, such relationships/implicit contracts can enhance firm value by enhancing the effective use of employees' knowledge and skills.
22
Our empirical analysis show a highly significant and positive relationship between delegation and an individual employee's trust of management. This is true for both our pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates. The results also suggest an endogeneity between trust and delegation. Nonetheless, the trust-delegation relationship remains -indeed, becomes stronger -when we instrument for trust in our IV estimates. Third, consistent with economic models of organizations, a number of other factors are also significantly related to delegation, including employee occupation, gender and human capital.
Finally, while our results confirm a significant relationship between trust and delegation, we do not explain here which actions are most important in the evolution (or maintenance) of trust. A key practical question for managers and researchers is 'what produces the high-trust equilibrium in firms?'. Indeed, understanding the answer to this question could help explain persistent performance differences between seemingly similar firms (Gibbons and Henderson, 2013) . Our results indicate that trust is better understood as an individual-level relationship between an employee and management, rather than as a group-level organizational culture. Furthermore, consistent with the burden of past promises argument 23 of Li et al. (2017) , we also find trust tends to deteriorate over time. Our analysis is just a first step, and the critical mechanism linking trust, to delegation and on to better firm performance requires further research.
22 Trust is potentially also important in facilitating communication in the absence of formal contracts. This would be an interesting topic for future research.
23 Intuitively, as circumstance change due to random shocks, the cost of keeping past promises goes up until eventually a firm defaults on a promise or, alternatively, random shocks themselves cause a breach of promise.
